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Education is thought to be central to economic development. Yet,
relatively little is known about how developing countries might ad-
vance school participation. In November, 2001 the Indian Supreme
Court issued a remarkable interim order directing errant Indian states
to o®er children in government primary schools a warm school lunch.
This paper uses this exogenous policy change to evaluate the impact
of school lunches on early primary school enrolment. It ¯nds that the
introduction of a school lunch is associated with a 25 per cent increase
in class 1 enrolment. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that
school lunches bridge the overall gender or caste gaps in enrolment.
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11 Introduction
Education is thought to be central to economic development. Bene¯cial in
and of itself, it is also viewed as a major contributor to human capital, leading
to higher productivity and living standards. Primary education is thought
to be associated with especially high returns.1 Its importance is enshrined in
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which call for universal primary
education by 2015.
In fact, primary education is far from universal and this MDG remains
elusive. UNICEF, the agency responsible for tracking progress on this MDG,
estimates a net primary school enrolment rate in developing countries of 84
per cent; this is also estimated to be the Indian average (UNICEF (2008)).
The rate drops to 65 per cent in the least developed countries. In view of this,
governments across the developing world, India included, have instituted a
wide range of policies aimed at improving schooling inputs.
In this paper I examine the e®ect of one such policy, the provision of a
warm school lunch in Indian primary schools, on early primary school enrol-
ment. This analysis is useful for two main reasons. First, India's primary edu-
cation problem is important from a policy perspective in terms of sheer scale.
India is thought to have the largest number of primary school-aged children
and the largest number out-of-school primary-school-aged children in the
world (UNICEF (2008)). Moreover, school lunches address not only educa-
tion de¯ciencies but also nutritional de¯ciencies and hunger. India's primary
school lunch program, which provides lunch to 120 million children every
school day, is the largest school meal program in the world (Kingdon (2006))
and is also likely to be one of the world's largest child nutrition programs.
Second, studies examining the e®ect of schooling policy interventions are
typically plagued by endogeneity problems associated with omitted variable
bias, which may operate in two directions. If on the one hand parents or
communities can in°uence school inputs, unobserved e®ects can lead to an
overestimate of the impact of school policies on schooling outcomes. On
1Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) estimate private returns to primary education of
over 25%.
2the other hand the problem of \purposive placement", whereby governments
target interventions to places with unobserved poor schooling outcomes, may
result in an underestimate of the true e®ect of policy interventions.
These endogeneity problems lie at the heart of the criticism of studies
which apply simple OLS to cross-sectional evidence (e.g. Hanushek (1995)
and Glewwe (2002)). Economists have recently dealt with this in one of two
ways. The ¯rst is to resort to randomized evaluation.2 The second has been
to use natural experiments, i.e. exploit natural variation in schooling inputs
which are uncorrelated with schooling outcomes.3
In this paper I exploit a third strategy: exogenous policy variation. The
policy change I examine in this paper { the provision of a warm school lunch
in government and government-funded primary schools { was the result of
a 2001 Indian Supreme Court directive which was instigated by a drought,
and not even motivated by improving schooling outcomes. Moreover, the
fact that the directive was binding for some Indian states which had no such
program in place, and non-binding for others which had long-established
school lunches provides us with exogenous variation across states which can
be used to establish the causal e®ect of school lunches on schooling outcomes.4
Using a large panel data census of schools from 7 South Indian districts
for 3 academic years from 2001 to 2003, I ¯nd that the introduction of a
school lunch is associated with a 25 per cent increase in class 1 (i.e. ¯rst
grade) enrolment. This is comparable in magnitude to the impact attributed
to school lunches in a couple of more casual, smaller-scale surveys in India.5
2Banerjee, Du°o, Cole, and Linden (2007) have recent applications in the Indian con-
text.
3See Kremer (2003) for a review of the former, Glewwe (2002) for a review of the latter,
and Kremer and Glewwe (2005) for a review of both.
4This approach is therefore closely related the natural experiments strategy, but distinct
in that the exogenous variation here directly concerns the policy variable. In this sense the
paper follows Du°o (2001), who examines the e®ect of a large school building program in
Indonesia on educational attainment and wages.
5Khera (2002) ¯nds a 23% increase in enrolment following the introduction of school
lunches in her 63 Rajasthan schools. Drµ eze and Goyal (2003) ¯nd an 18%, 11%, and 14%
increase in enrolment in their Rajasthan, Chattisgarh and Karnataka villages respectively,
with samples of 27 schools in each case. It is 5 percentage points smaller than the enrol-
ment e®ect of school lunches based on a randomized evaluation of 25 preschools in Kenya
Vermeersch (2003).
3There is, however, no evidence in these data to suggest that school lunches
have narrowed the overall gender gap in enrolment, or had a higher impact
on the enrolment of lower castes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background re-
garding the exogenous nature of the policy variation and the anticipated
e®ect of school lunches on schooling outcomes. Section 3 describes the data.
An outline of the empirical strategy in section 4 is followed by some prelim-
inary analysis in section 5. Section 6 presents the estimation results, with
robustness checks in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Supreme Court Directive
In 2001 Rajasthan, a state in Northwest India, su®ered from drought. The
2000 Southwest monsoon had failed for the third year running and 31 of 32
districts were o±cially declared as drought-stricken (Rajalakshmi (2001)).
Earlier that year, reports of drought-instigated starvation deaths began to
appear in the press.
In April, 2001 the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Rajasthan
submitted a writ petition to the Supreme Court, pointing out that \while
on the one hand the stocks of food grains in the country are more than
the capacity of storage facilities, on the other there are reports from various
states alleging starvation deaths".6 The writ urged the court to instruct
the Government to release public food stocks, arguing that the right to life
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution included the right to food.7 The
petition has culminated in protracted public interest litigation which is yet
to be concluded.8
6Rajasthan PUCL Writ in Supreme Court on Famine Deaths, PUCL Bulletin, Novem-
ber 2001.
7Article 21 of the Constitution of India is entitled \Protection of life and personal
liberty" and states (in its entirety), \No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law."
8PUCL vs Union of India and Others, Writ Petition [Civil] 196 of 2001. The Right To
Food Campaign has been closely monitoring the developments associated with this case
4On November 28 2001, the Supreme Court issued a remarkable \interim
order" directing states to introduce cooked mid-day meals, i.e. a warm school
lunch, in all government-run and government-aided primary schools.9 Over
the course of the next 5 years, (the deadline for for implementation was
January, 2005) the vast majority of Indian states had a midday meal in place.
This directive serves the analysis well for two reasons. First, it is di±cult
to dispute that the primary school policy change it induced was exogenous:
The directive was prompted by a drought of unprecedented severity, and it
was motivated by nutritional rather than schooling improvement objectives.
Second, the directive, although issued to all states, was not binding for 3
states { Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Kerala had long-established warm school
lunch programs, dating back to 1982, 1984, and 1995 respectively. This
generates the inter-state variation necessary for identi¯cation.10
The implementation of the midday meal program is the joint responsi-
bility of central and state governments. The Central Government provides
¯nancial assistance which amounts to Rupees 2.21 (or just under 5 cents in
2001) per child per school day. This comprises the cost of food grains, a
subsidy to transport this grain from the nearest government grain godown
to the primary school, another subsidy towards monitoring and evaluation,
and maintains an extremely informative website at www.righttofoodindia.org.
9The basic entitlement outlined by the directive is that \Every child in every gov-
ernment and government-assisted school should be given a prepared midday meal; with
a minimum content of 300 calories and 8-12 grams of protein each day of school; for a
minimum of 200 days a year."
10The only publication of which I am aware that resorts to a similar strategy for a
developing country is Chin (2005). She provides a thoughtful evaluation of the impact of
the addition of a second teacher to single teacher schools in the 1987 education scheme
\Operation Blackboard", by exploiting inter-state variation in single-teacher schools via
a di®erences-in-di®erences approach. The research design here owes much to her paper: I
too use a di®erences-in-di®erences approach which exploits inter-state variation to evaluate
the impact of a schooling input in India. However, our papers di®er in at least 3 important
ways. First, whereas teaching inputs comprised only one of several policy instruments in
Operation Blackboard, the only primary school input a®ected by the Supreme Court di-
rective was school lunches. This allow us to present a relatively clean impact evaluation of
this particular policy. Second, the fact that we rely on panel data rather than (repeated)
cross sectional data arguably arms us with a more powerful set of tools with which to
identify any treatment e®ect. Third, unlike Operation Blackboard which was clearly mo-
tivated by educational objectives, the Supreme Court directive constituted an exogenous
policy change.
5and a cooking cost allowance.11 The overall responsibility for the directive's
implementation lies with state governments, with local government bodies,
typically the village government (panchayat), responsible for its day-to-day
operations.
2.2 School Lunches
School lunches are thought to be important in promoting primary school
outcomes on a number of di®erent dimensions.12 First, they are thought to
boost school enrolment. They act as an implicit subsidy to parents thereby
enabling some to send their children to school. In addition children, partic-
ularly those from poorer families, are more likely to be willing to enrol in
school as lunches provide welcome respite from hunger and dietary monotony.
Second, they encourage not only enrolment but also attendance. Since
they are o®ered at mid-day and are consumed on the school premises, children
have an incentive to actually stay at school for most of the school day. This
is in stark contrast to the monthly grain rations o®ered by most states prior
to the institution of warm school lunches under the auspices of the National
Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary Education, initiated in 1995.
Under this so-called \dry rations" scheme, children commonly enroled in
school in order to qualify for grain rations but this did not readily translate
into school attendance.
Third, by alleviating classroom hunger, school lunches are thought to
improve learning. Quite apart from the direct consumption e®ect of school
lunches, this indirect learning e®ect is likely to serve as an additional boost
to school enrolment and attendance. Finally, school lunches are thought to
promote social equity along two dimensions. On the gender dimension, micro-
survey evidence from North India suggests that they reduce the gender gap in
school participation.13 This would be consistent with parents having a higher
11Guidelines of National Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary Education
(2004)
12This section draws from micro-survey evidence in PROBE (1999), in whose design I
participated, Drµ eze and Goyal (2003), and Khera (2006).
13Khera (2006) provides an overview of these ¯ndings.
6elasticity of demand for girls' education relative to boys' education. On the
caste dimension, since caste commensality (in addition to caste endogamy)
is the one of the pillars of the Indian caste structure, the simple act of sitting
down and eating together can be a powerful means of breaking down caste
barriers.
3 Data
The data I exploit in this paper come from the District Information Sys-
tem for Education (DISE) and cover the academic years 2001/2, 2002/3
and 2003/4 (for which I use the shorthand 2001, 2002 and 2003 hereafter).
They comprise a census of primary (class 1-5) and lower secondary (class 6-8)
schools in 3 Tamil Nadu districts (Dharmapuri, Pudukottai, and Ramanatha-
puram) and 4 Karnataka districts (Kolar, Bangalore Rural, Chamarajnagar
and Mysore) which border Tamil Nadu. The Tamil Nadu districts constitute
our control group { school lunches had been in place in these districts since
the early 1980s. The Karnataka districts are our control group: the Supreme
Court directive was implemented simultaneously in each of these districts in
June, 2003.14
These data have at least 4 main strengths. First, Tamil Nadu and Kar-
nataka have been reported to provide lunches of comparably good quality,
and this is reassuring given that midday meals are not necessarily a homoge-
nous good(Drµ eze and Goyal (2003)). Second, prior to 1953 when Indian state
borders were drawn according to linguistic lines, Tamil Nadu and much of
Karnataka were part of the Madras Presidency. Since historic institutions
are thought to have a bearing on development we may expect that, having
shared common political institutions and educational policies, Tamil Nadu
and Karnataka would follow similar development paths. And in Figure 1,
which presents population and literacy data from India's decennial censuses,
14This is admittedly a perversion of the terms treatment and control, whereby the latter
typically involves having no policy in place. Notice, however, that a more conventional
understanding of treatment and control would be recovered by regarding schools in Kar-
nataka before 2003 as having received treatment (where treatment is having no policy in
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Source: Census of India 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001
Figure 1: Population and Literacy Trends
it does indeed seem to be the case that (at least on the basis of these data)
the two states have developed in a largely parallel fashion over the last four
decades. Third, because they are annual data, we minimize the possibility
of confounding policy changes having transpired in between consecutive sur-
vey years. Finally, neither Tamil Nadu nor Karnataka were a®ected by the
2000-2001 drought.15 This means that treatment and enrolment e®ects are
not picking up drought e®ects.
The DISE survey was launched in order to monitor progress in education
outcomes for those districts covered by the District Primary School Edu-
cation Programme (DPEP). The school survey questionnaire, which poses
detailed questions pertaining to schooling inputs (such as physical infras-
tructure, funding and teaching sta®), are answered at the school level. Data
15The 8 states which were drought-a²icted were in North and Central India: Chhatis-
garh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, and
Uttaranchal.
8reliability is veri¯ed through checks for internal consistency via a standard-
ized software, and at the district level by professionally trained EMIS units.16
The school sample used in the main analysis comprises a balanced three-
year panel of schools from 2001-2003 located in 4 districts in Karnataka and 3
districts in Tamil Nadu covered by the DPEP. Although the survey contains
both private and public schools, I restrict attention to government schools
since, although both government and government-aided schools were subject
to the Supreme Court directive, Karnataka did not introduce school lunches
in government-aided schools until September, 2004.17
The main outcome of interest in this paper is class 1 enrolment. The
reason for this focus is to minimize noise in the dependent variable. In
particular, enrolment in class C for C ¸ 2 is conditional on having been
enroled in class C ¡ 1 in 2002; if a child was enroled in school in 2002 when
no school meal was o®ered in Karnataka, any increase in enrolment in that
state observed between 2002 and 2003 may well be unre°ective of a response
to a school meal incentive.
The explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable called \Lunch".
It is equal to 1 for all three years of observation in the case of Tamil Nadu
schools in our sample, and equal to 0 in 2001 and 2002 and 1 in 2003 for
Karnataka. In India, the academic year commences in June and government
schools accept enrolment until September. Since our enrolment data are
updated on September 30th of each year and school lunches were introduced
in these Karnataka districts in June, 2003, our 2003 enrolment ¯gures can
be reasonably expected to pick up any enrolment e®ects associated with the
introduction of school lunches in this year.
Although there was no generalized provision of school lunches prior to
2003 in our Karnataka districts, some government schools have been known
to provide lunches under special circumstances. In order to minimize mea-
surement error on the lunch variable, I therefore restricted attention to \un-
exceptional" primary schools. In particular, I only included schools which
16see http://www.dpepmis.org/ for more details.
17The government operated schools in our sample comprise both department of educa-
tion as well as local body schools, with the bulk falling in the latter category. Government-
aided schools comprise only 3% of the sample and results are robust to their inclusion.
9covered grades 1-5 (and not some fraction thereof), are co-educational, are
day-schools (not boarding), were not located in tribal areas, and were taught
in either Tamil or Kannada, the local languages in Tamil Nadu and Kar-
nataka, respectively.18 The full sample comprises a balanced three-year panel
of 3148 schools in Karnataka and 2994 schools in Tamil Nadu.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics pertaining to the average logarithm
of class 1 enrolment and total primary school enrolment for this sample, dis-
aggregated by state, year and gender. We use log enrolment for ease of
interpretation given that our data pertain to enrolment levels and not enrol-
ment rates. Class 1 average log enrolment for Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in
2001 in row 1 corresponds to an enrolment of 25 and 16 students, respectively.
The table shows that in both states, enrolment has been declining over this
period. This is consistent with declining fertility rates in these two states and
has been observed by others.19 Class 1 as well as overall school enrolment
is higher in Tamil Nadu than in Karnataka and both states demonstrate a
gender gap in enrolment.
[Table 1]
4 Empirical Strategy
The basic strategy is to examine how enrolment in Karnataka, following its
institution of a school lunch in 2003, changed relative to that in Tamil Nadu,
which already had a school lunch in place. This comparison amounts to a
di®erence-in-di®erences model.20 The basic equation is:21
18Local language schools comprised approximately 90% of the total school sample in
both states.
19e.g. WorldBank (2003). The recent release of the household demographic and health
surveys (DHS) also shows this pattern of declining enrolment.
20I am grateful to Paul Glewwe for bringing my attention to a contemporaneous paper
by Farzana Afridi, which examines the impact of midday meals using a similar di®erence-
in-di®erences strategy. Using cross-sectional data for a sample of 615 households and 74
primary schools across 14 villages, Afridi (2007) exploits staggered implementation of the
midday meal policy within Madhya Pradesh, rather than inter-state variation, to identify
its e®ects on schooling outcomes.
21This approach follows Imbens and Wooldridge (2007).
10yit = ¿Lit + xit° + ¸t + ²it (1)
The main variable of interest is Lit, the school lunch indicator, which takes
on value 1 if school i o®ers a school lunch during periods t = 1;2;3 (corre-
sponding to 2001;2002 and 2003). In our case, Lit = 1 in each period for
schools in TN; in Karnataka, Lit = 0 for t = 1;2 and Li3 = 1. ¸t denotes
a (potentially) time-varying intercept and xit denotes a vector of controls,
which in our robustness checks will include a wide range of other schooling
inputs; ²it is the error term.
Estimating equation (1) using OLS is likely to su®er from omitted vari-
ables bias, and this manifested in two ways. One is a standard unobserved
school e®ect. This may be captured as follows:
yit = ¿Lit + xit° + ci + ¸t + uit (2)
where ci re°ects school time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Equation
(2) can be estimated either by ¯rst di®erences or by ¯xed e®ects. When the
error term is serially correlated { which may be reasonably anticipated in the
context of school enrolment { applying the ¯rst di®erence (FD) estimator is
more e±cient than the ¯xed e®ects (FE) estimator. Taking the ¯rst di®erence
of equation (2), we obtain:
¢yit = ¿¢Lit + ¢xit° + ´t + ¢uit (3)
where ¿ is the di®erences-in-di®erences estimate. and ´t = ¸t¡¸t¡1 are time
e®ects. Since the introduction of school lunches in Karnataka arguably con-
stituted an exogenous policy change, the strict exogeneity criteria is satis¯ed,
so OLS applied equation (3) is consistent.
An additional source of omitted variable bias stems from the possibility
that enrolment may be driven by unobserved trends, most notably fertility
rates in the school catchment area, or even migration. This is captured by
using a \correlated random coe±cients" model (Wooldridge (2005)):
11yit = ¿Lit + xit° + ¸t + ci + git + uit (4)
where school-speci¯c trends in responses are captured by gi. Taking the FD
of equation (4) yields:
¢yit = ¿¢Lit + ¢xit° + ´t + gi + ¢uit (5)
Because we have data for a total of 3 periods, estimating equation (5) using
FD or ¯xed-e®ects (FE) produces identical estimates.
5 Preliminary Analysis
In addition to the exogeneity of the mid-day program, the validity of the
identi¯cation strategy in this di®erence-in-di®erences approach relies on the
so-called \parallel trends" assumption { that outcomes would have followed a
parallel evolution in the absence of treatment. This assumption is untestable,
and the two years of data prior to the institution of school lunches in Kar-
nataka are unlikely to provide a very accurate picture. Nevertheless, the data
as presented in Figure 2 do suggest that primary school enrolment and class
1 enrolment in these Karnataka and Tamil Nadu districts are moving in the
same general direction prior to 2003.
Figure 3 presents a rough estimate of the impact of midday meals on class
1 enrolment. Panel 1 describes the evolution of average class 1 log enrolment.
As we saw in table 1, in both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, class 1 enrolment
declined over the survey period. In Tamil Nadu, this decline was steeper from
2003-2002 relative to 2002-2001 whereas in Karnataka, this decline became
°atter after 2002 with the introduction of school lunches. In other words,
the enrolment gap between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka narrowed following
the introduction of school lunches. Panel 2 provides an idea of the extent to
which this gap was ¯lled. Between 2002 and 2001 the change in enrolment
was approximately 0.146 points higher in Tamil Nadu than it was Karnataka.
After school lunches were introduced in Karnataka, this order was reversed:



































































































































































Source: Dise 2001, 2002, 2003;Y−axes present school−level averages
Figure 2: Average log(Enrolment)
points higher in Karnataka than in Tamil Nadu. This graphical analysis
suggests that school lunches are associated with just approximately 22.7 per
cent increase in enrolment. And this can be seen more clearly by comparing
the second di®erences of class 1 log enrolment between Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka, presented in the bottom panel.
6 Basic results
I start by estimating the baseline models speci¯ed in equations (3) and (5).
Results are presented in table 2. In this and all subsequent regression tables,
standard errors are clustered at the school level, and time trends are taken
into account.22 A Wooldridge (2002) test of the null hypothesis of no ¯rst
order auto correlation is marginally rejected (at the 11% level) for total
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Figure 3: Class 1 Average log(Enrolment)
enrolment and strongly rejected at the 5% level for girls' enrolment.23 This,
along with the exogenous nature of the policy change suggests that the OLS
will yield e±cient and consistent estimates when applied to equation (3);
these FD OLS estimates are presented in the top half of table 2.24 A Hausman
test (whose p-value is presented on the last row of the bottom panel) favors a
¯xed e®ects over a random e®ects speci¯cation in the estimation of equation
(5) for class 1; these FD FE estimates for the correlated random coe±cients
model are presented in the bottom half of the table.
[Table 2]
The dependent variable in table 2 is log enrolment { ¯rst for class 1,
and then for primary school as a whole. In each case, aggregate as well
as gender-disaggregated enrolment is presented. Our explanatory variable of
23I apply the xtserial command as developed by Drukker (2003).
24FE estimation (available upon request) produced the identical point estimates for
our di®erences in di®erences estimate ¿ on the lunch variable for total, girls and boys
enrolment. I therefore stick to the FD estimator for ease of interpretation.
14interest is the school lunch variable. In this and all remaining FD estimation,
this variable (and all other right-hand-side variables) are represented in ¯rst
di®erences, so in e®ect this variable is equal to 1 for Karnataka schools in
2003 and 0 elsewhere.
The ¯rst row presents coe±cient estimates on the impact of school lunch
on enrolment using FD OLS. The point estimate is positive and signi¯cant
across the board for class 1. It suggests that the introduction of a school
lunch is associated with an 8.4% increase in total class 1 enrolment in the
sample schools.25 The point estimate is slightly higher for boys than for girls,
but this di®erence is not signi¯cant, suggesting that the school lunches have
the same impact on boys' and girls' enrolment.
The ¯rst row of FD FE estimates in the bottom panel indicate that once
unobserved trends are taken into account, the impact of school lunches is
about twice as large. The coe±cient of 0.226 for class 1 enrolment is consis-
tent with the graphical analysis. Overall, the point estimates suggest that
the introduction of a school lunch is associated with an 25% increase in class
1 enrolment. This is slightly lower for boys and slightly higher for girls, but
any gender di®erence in the impact of school lunch is not signi¯cant. This is
not consist with both micro-survey as well as anecdotal evidence from North
India, where enrolment responses from girls have allegedly been substantially
higher than that for boys.26 If elasticity increases as you move up the de-
mand curve, this discrepancy may re°ect the fact that the absolute level of
girls' enrolment is smaller in North relative to South India.
The large positive e®ect on class 1 enrolment in the bottom panel of table
2 is not re°ected in overall primary school enrolment. The negative point
estimate on the lunch variable for primary school enrolment in the FD OLS
results in the top panel is insigni¯cant once aggregate trends are taken into
account in bottom panel. This con¯rms our prior that school lunches are
25= exp(0:081) ¡ 1
26Drµ eze and Kingdon (2001) ¯nd, on the basis of their cross-sectional, that midday
meals have a strong positive association with girls but not boys educational attainment. In
Rajasthan and Chattisgarh, Drµ eze and Goyal (2003) ¯nd that the percentage increase in
enrolment is three times as large for girls than boys, and in Madhya Pradesh Afridi (2007)
¯nds a 10 percentage point increase for class 1 girls, with no corresponding increase for
boys.
15unlikely to increase enrolment beyond class 1 in these data. More generally,
schooling costs increase with school class whereas the value of a this lunch
subsidy remains constant. A negligible impact of school lunches for overall
primary school enrolment relative to class 1 enrolment may therefore re°ect
the smaller relative value of the school lunches in later school years.27
[Table 3]
The DISE data provide enrolment ¯gures disaggregated by up to 7 caste
categories. Caste groups vary from region to region in India, and only 2
of these caste categories are reasonably comparable between Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu: \scheduled castes" (SC), which constitute the lowest tier in the
caste hierarchy, and \other backward castes" (OBC) which rank higher than
the scheduled castes, although they typically do not constitute the highest
caste group.
Table 3 presents results regarding the e®ect of school lunch on class 1
enrolment disaggregated by these two caste categories. The ¯rst 3 columns
present estimates pertaining to OBCs and the last 3 columns present results
for SCs. (Note that these two caste groups together form a strict subset
of aggregate class 1 enrolment.) The regression speci¯cation in the top and
bottom panels are identical to that in table 2. The middle panel provides a
FE estimation, by way of contrast to the FD estimates in the top panel.
The results in the top and bottom panels pertaining to OBCs in the ¯rst
3 columns suggest that the enrolment response in this group is comparable to
that of the population at large presented in table 2. The enrolment response
to school lunches is over 8% according to the FD OLS estimate and just over
20% according the FD FE estimate, and there is no gender gap in responses.
SC responses are markedly di®erent. Estimates presented in the ¯rst row
of last 3 columns suggest that school lunches have no impact on enrolment
among this caste group. One possible reason for this surprising ¯nding is that
FD OLS is not an appropriate model in this case: although a Wooldridge
test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for total as well as boy's
class 1 enrolment, we are unable to reject this null in the case of girls. In this
case, FE is likely to be more e±cient than FD. Such FE estimates, presented
27Afridi (2007) has a similar ¯nding and provides the same line of argument.
16in the middle panel of table 3, suggest that there is a positive overall SC
class 1 enrolment response to school lunches, driven by an increase in girls'
SC enrolment. Enrolment among SC girls increases by 8.5% { a number
comparable to that of girls in the population at large { but there remains no
signi¯cant increase in enrolment among SC boys. This result suggests that
whereas school lunches do not close the overall gender gap in education, they
do close the gender gap in education among the most disadvantaged castes.
The FD FE results in the bottom panel suggest that the picture is not
quite as bleak for SC boys as the top two panels suggest: SC boys' enrolment
according to these estimates rises by almost 12%. The analogous increase for
SC girls, OBC girls and OBC boys is 18.5% and 23% and 19.7%, respectively.
This points to a SC-OBC caste gap of 4.5 percentage points for girls and
7.7 percentage points for boys, and a gender gap of 6.5 percentage points
(favoring girls) among SCs.
7 Robustness Checks
All governments, at any given point in time, have numerous di®erent policies
aimed at promoting schooling outcomes. This presents a problem in the
identi¯cation of a causal e®ect of the school lunch program to the extent that
there may have been confounding policy changes in Tamil Nadu or Karnataka
in 2003.28 In India, the two main programmes aimed at promoting primary
school education are the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP)
the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA).29
The DPEP was conceptualized in the early 1990s in response to India's
low literacy rates. Its primary aims were to provide primary school access
for all children, reduce dropout rates, increase learning achievements, and
reduce gender and caste gaps (DOE (1995)). The costs of the programme
are shared by the center and the state; the former provides 85% of the funds
28I am grateful to Jyotsna Jalan and Jean Drµ eze for useful input here.
29Although several micro-initiatives were launched by state governments, to the best of
my knowledge, no major initiative was launched over the survey period at the district or
state-level.
17with considerable support from donor agencies.30 Phase I of the program,
launched in 1995, covered 42 districts in 8 states (including Tamil Nadu
and Karnataka), and phase II was launched in 1996. In 2003, DPEP was
operational in 272 districts in 18 states.
Since DISE was launched precisely to monitor progress under DPEP, all
the districts in the sample were covered by DPEP over the entire sample
period. To this extent, the observed e®ect of the introduction of school
lunches in Karnataka in 2003 cannot be confounded with any e®ect associated
with cross state-time di®erences in the introduction (or withdrawal) of the
DPEP per se.
The SSA, aimed at the 6-14 age group, has the similar aim of achieving
universal enrolment, bridging gender and caste gaps, achieving universal re-
tention, and improving education quality.31 During the survey period (under
the Ninth Plan), central and state governments shared costs on an 85:15 ba-
sis. To the extent that it was launched in 2001, at the same time in all states,
any di®erence in enrolment outcomes in the treatment group (Karnataka in
2003) cannot be attributed to the introduction of the scheme as a whole.
That being said, our estimates may still be subject to omitted variable
bias to the extent that both the SSA and DPEP employ a variety of di®erent
policy instruments. These include improvements in schooling infrastructure
and teaching aids, provision of school grants, increased monitoring, and in-
creased schooling personnel. Table 4 provides estimates for class 1 enrolment
while controlling for a wide range such schooling inputs. To the extent that
these inputs are endogenous, all the coe±cients in this table will be bias. To
the extent that they are not, however, controlling for them will provide an
indication of the whether our lunch coe±cient estimates su®er from omitted
variable bias.
Improvements in school infrastructure are captured through 4 variables:
the provision of electricity and water, the number of good quality class-
rooms, and the availability of a toilet facilities. Teaching aids are captured
30see World Bank (2003) for a review of the evidence regarding the impact of this
program; Jalan and Glinskaya (2003) use a propensity score matching method in their
impact evaluation.
31see http://ssa.nic.in/
18through the number of blackboards and the availability of a bookbank (li-
brary). Grants are captured through the amount received in terms of 2
DPEP-funded grants: a school development grant and a teacher grant. The
number of visits from the cluster resource center (CRC) and block resource
center (BRC) measure increased monitoring. Personnel improvements are
captured through the number of sanctioned teachers, parateachers, and non-
teaching positions.
[Table 4]
Columns 1 and 2 analyze overall class 1 enrolment (using FD OLS and
FD FE, respectively), while columns 3-6 examine caste-disaggregated e®ects,
¯rst for OBCs and then for SCs. The coe±cients on the control variables
need to be interpreted with caution because of potential endogeneity issues.
Nevertheless, those in columns 1-4 suggest that these schooling inputs are
associated with increased aggregate as well as OBC enrolment. Electricity
(though not water) provision is associated with an approximately 5% higher
enrolment; an additional good condition classroom with up to 2% higher
enrolment; a common toilet is associated with an additional 3-4% increase
and the number of blackboards with just over 1% higher enrolment; teacher
grants are associated with a slightly higher enrolment, as are the number
of monitoring visits. While parateachers and non-teaching sta® have no
positive association with overall class 1 enrolment, the number of teachers
has a strong positive relationship, with an additional teacher being associated
with an approximately 9% higher enrolment.
As columns 5 and 6 indicate, many of these schooling inputs either have
no signi¯cant association, or a much lower positive association with SC en-
rolment. Only CRC visits, blackboards, and the number of teachers are
associated with higher SC enrolment, and the FD OLS point estimates of
the latter two are about half the size of those for aggregate enrolment. Once
unobserved trends are accounted for, the only signi¯cant control variable
is the number of teachers, with an extra teacher being associated with ap-
proximately 3-4% higher SC enrolment (compared with 9% for enrolment at
large.)
Most importantly in the context of this paper, the result from table 2
19regarding the impact of school lunches on enrolment appears to be robust to
the inclusion of these controls: The lunch coe±cients are, if anything, slightly
higher. In columns 1 and 2, respectively, the FD OLS point estimate is 0.0822
compared to 0.081 in table 2, and the FD FE estimate is 0.262 compared to
0.226. The point estimates for OBCs and SCs follow a similar pattern. It is
also worth noting that even with the more conservative FD OLS estimates,
the only discrete input with a comparable point estimate school lunches is
teachers: The results suggest that the impact of school lunches on enrolment
is statistically equivalent to the impact of introducing an additional teacher
to the school.
The sample I use comprises a balanced panel of government-run primary
schools. Hence, the estimates heretofore have essentially ignored the possibil-
ity that the observed changes in enrolment may re°ect alternative primary
school provision, either in the form of newly established public schools {
whose construction has been one of the major policy initiatives under both
DPEP and SSA { or private schools. If, for instance, there had been a boom
in private school provision or public school construction in Tamil Nadu in
2003, the school lunch estimate may be picking up the e®ect of this on declines
in public primary school enrolment for Tamil Nadu relative to Karnataka,
rather than the positive e®ect of lunch provision in Karnataka. I account for
this by restricting the sample to the 330 villages in Tamil Nadu and 1658
villages in Karnataka which, over the course of the sample period, had a
single village school.
The results, presented in columns 7 and 8 of table 3, indicate that school
lunches have had an even larger impact on class 1 enrolment in these single-
school villages, with the point estimates using FD OLS and FD FE suggesting
a 15.7% and 44.5% increase in enrolment, respectively.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I used an exogenous policy change to evaluate the impact of
school lunches on class 1 enrolment in India. The FD OLS estimates suggest
that the provision of a warm school lunch is associated with an approximately
208% increase in class 1 enrolment. When we account for aggregate trends using
FD FE, the increase in enrolment associated with school lunches is 25%.
The size of the e®ect is impressive. Even if we take the conservative
8% estimate at face value and compare it to the point estimates of other
potential schooling inputs, then it would seem that introducing a school
lunch is associated with a similar increase in enrolment as adding an addi-
tional teacher, and teachers are expensive. The average government school
teacher in India receives between Rs. 5,000 - 8,000 per month base pay,
plus perks (Pritchett and Pande (2006)). Since the average primary school
in our sample has about 117 students (the median is even lower at 88 and the
Karnataka average is 95), this means that a lunch program at such a school
which meets the Supreme Court's minimum directive of providing lunch for
200 days would, at unit price of 2.21 Rupees per student, cost roughly 4,300
Rupees per month { substantially lower than even the lower bound of the
average government school teacher salary.32
This paper controlled for a wide range of schooling inputs and accounted
for unobserved school e®ects. Nevertheless, the fact that I just engaged
in such a back-of-the-envelope calculation highlights one drawback of this
study: I have imposed a linear structure on school lunches, while reality has
a tendency be non-linear. For example, if school lunches facilitate cognitive
acquisition, a richer model may want to account for the possibility that they
can be complementary to teaching inputs. Similarly, if enrolment responses
are higher at lower levels initial levels of enrolment, the estimates are likely
to exaggerate the impact of school lunches to the extent that Karnataka had
lower initial enrolment than Tamil Nadu. Although the overall direction of
any bias is unclear, the research design does not permit an exploration of
such interactions.
In general, the results pertaining to aggregate class 1 enrolment suggest
that school lunches may be a useful policy instrument towards attaining the
second MDG pertaining to universal primary school attainment. The dis-
tributional impact of school lunches suggests, however, that they may be
somewhat less e®ective in attaining the third MDG, which calls for the elim-
32[(117 students) X (Rs. 2.21 per student) X (200 days)]/12.
21ination of gender disparity in all levels of education by 2015. The estimates
suggest that overall class 1 enrolment increases by the same proportion for
girls and boys; in other words, school meals are not closing the overall gender
gap in Karnataka. This ¯nding is contrary to evidence from North India, and
may simply re°ect lower demand elasticities corresponding to higher female
enrolment in the South. Hence, it cannot be interpreted as evidence that
school lunches do not narrow the gender gap, but does nevertheless suggest
that this policy instrument is are unlikely to close (a narrow) gender gap.
Where school lunches do appear to be narrowing the gender gap is among
scheduled castes. One possible reason for this is that school lunches tend to
promote learning. Since lower caste women tend to have higher labor force
participation rates than upper caste women the returns to learning, and
therefore the incentive for school enrolment, among the former group may
be larger than that for the latter. This is encouraging considering that this
demographic tends to be characterized by particularly low levels of school
participation.
Although the results pertaining to caste need to be treated with due
caution { our caste classi¯cations are crude and we cannot control for unob-
served heterogeneity below the school level { perhaps the most disheartening
result is that school lunches do not appear to be narrowing the caste gap in
education, especially among boys. The fact that lower castes are not more
responsive to school lunches { at least in these data { suggests that they may
face more subtle constraints to school enrolment and underscores the com-
mon consensus that reducing caste inequality in education outcomes remains
a serious challenge.33
Developing a better understanding of the schooling choice problem would
help demystify gender and caste di®erences in responses to schooling in-
puts, and combining this with a richer model of the schooling production
function would help us better grasp precisely which policy instruments (or
combination thereof) are most e®ective in bridging social gaps in enrol-
33For example, Deshpande (2000) ¯nds that even in a relatively egalitarian state like
Kerala with universal primary school enrolment, caste-based educational disparities per-
sist.
22ment. The scope of these extensions are, admittedly, limited by both data
constraints and endogeneity concerns. But even within our di®erence-in-
di®erences framework, with the help of additional data, there is room for
further analysis to answer questions pertaining to the role of school lunches
in promoting learning, nutritional and health outcomes, and retention. This
is left to future research.
23Table 1: Average log(Enrolment)
Tamil Nadu Karnataka
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Class 1 3.217 3.169 3.039 2.785 2.591 2.542
(0.694) (0.693) (0.714) (0.703) (0.710) (0.724)
Class 1 Boys 2.548 2.489 2.360 2.045 1.851 1.808
(0.761) (0.760) (0.786) (0.797) (0.805) (0.817)
Class 1 Girls 2.424 2.384 2.245 2.050 1.848 1.786
(0.773) (0.781) (0.801) (0.787) (0.794) (0.808)
Primary School 4.764 4.742 4.698 4.336 4.285 4.200
(0.669) (0.652) (0.655) (0.659) (0.664) (0.700)
Primary School Boys 4.109 4.087 4.045 3.638 3.585 3.498
(0.682) (0.666) (0.670) (0.682) (0.685) (0.724)
Primary School Girls 4.011 3.991 3.945 3.630 3.578 3.489
(0.688) (0.675) (0.677) (0.677) (0.683) (0.727)
Observations 2994 2994 2994 3148 3148 3148
This table presents log(enrolment), averaged across schools within a given state .
and academic year. Rows (1)-(3) present average log(enrolment) for Class 1 and
rows (4)-(6)present average log(enrolment) for primary school (i.e. classes 1-5).
Columns (1)-(3) present averages for 3 Tamil Nadu and columns (4)-(6), for 4
Karnataka districts. Total as well as gender-disaggregated ¯gures are presented in
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29Table 4: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable Class 1 log(enrolment)
Estimation FD OLS FD FE FD OLS FD FE FD OLS FD FE FD OLS FD FE
Caste All All OBC OBC SC SC All All
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Single Single
Lunch 0.0822*** 0.262*** 0.0844*** 0.228*** 0.0325 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.386***
(0.0152) (0.0229) (0.0198) (0.0309) (0.0260) (0.0432) (0.0289) (0.0452)
Electricity 0.0440*** 0.0578*** 0.0467** 0.0693*** 0.0208 0.0457 0.0370 0.0281
(0.0153) (0.0195) (0.0188) (0.0265) (0.0242) (0.0364) (0.0252) (0.0327)
Water 0.0115 -0.006 0.007 -0.014 -0.001 -0.036 0.035* 0.027
(0.0110) (0.0149) (0.0134) (0.0190) (0.0185) (0.0269) (0.0187) (0.0258)
Good condition classrms. 0.0186*** 0.0162*** 0.0174*** 0.0164*** 0.00668 0.00641 0.0253*** 0.0176**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Toilet 0.0378*** 0.0316** 0.0185 0.00577 0.0168 0.0127 0.0639*** 0.0621**
(0.0123) (0.0153) (0.0134) (0.0178) (0.0193) (0.0281) (0.0243) (0.0311)
No. blackboards 0.0122*** 0.0108*** 0.0122*** 0.0130*** 0.008** 0.006 0.0180*** 0.0134**
(0.003) (0.00320) (0.00254) (0.00380) (0.00310) (0.00436) (0.00502) (0.00532)
Bookbank -0.00296 -0.00194 0.0127 0.0176 0.0112 0.0147 -0.00936 -0.0123
(0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0162) (0.0193) (0.0271) (0.0225) (0.0289)
Sch. Devt Grant/100 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Teacher Grant/100 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.00139*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. CRC visits 0.004* 0.005* 0.001 0.002 0.008** 0.008 0.006* 0.008*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
No. BRC visits 0.002 0.004* 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No. teachers 0.0914*** 0.0855*** 0.0653*** 0.0624*** 0.0405*** 0.0334*** 0.0711*** 0.0771***
(0.0176) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0258) (0.0223)
No. Parateachers -0.010 -0.003 -0.022** -0.022** -0.013 -0.008 0.076* 0.088
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.040) (0.060) (0.045) (0.064)
No. non-teaching positions -0.013 -0.013 -0.020 -0.014 0.015 0.050 -0.012 0.00357
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.046) (0.031) (0.044)
2003 -0.002 -0.092*** -0.020 -0.086*** 0.047** -0.041 -0.017 -0.213***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038)
Constant -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.121*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.109*** -0.189*** -0.190***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 11506 11506 8788 8788 4871 4871 3651 3651
Adj. R-squared 0.134 0.119 0.0735 0.0746 0.0309 0.0252 0.157 0.152
This table presents the impact of school lunches on Class 1 enrolment, controlling for other schooling inputs
This impact is measured by the coe±cient on the \Lunch" variable (equal to 1 in 2003 in Karnataka
and 0 otherwise). Each of the columns pertain to a di®erent regression. FD OLS applies OLS
to ¯rst-di®erenced explanatory and dependent variables. FD FE applies ¯xed e®ects to
the ¯rst di®erences. \Caste" refers to to the castes covered in the regression sample.
OBC is \Other Backward Castes" and SC is \Scheduled Castes". \Sample" refers to the school
sample, where \Full" refers to all government-run schools, and \Single" pertains to those
government-run schools which were the single school in the village over the sample period 2001-2003
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the school level, are reported in parentheses.
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01;¤ ¤ p < 0:05;¤p < 0:1
30